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EUROPEAN PROTECTIONISM IN CLOUD
COMPUTING: ADDRESSING CONCERNS
OVER THE PATRIOT ACT
By John T. Billingst
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, both individuals and companies have embraced cloud com-
puting as the future of information technology ("IT") architecture.' An esti-
mated seventy-six percent of Americans use cloud computing services today,2
and its use by businesses is estimated to more than double in the next three
years.' Many companies around the world now outsource data storage and
processing to "the cloud,'" seeking to save money on IT infrastructure costs,
while benefiting from greater access and flexibility offered by the cloud.'
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I Jared A. Harshbarger, Cloud Computing Providers and Data Security Law: Building
Trust With United States Companies, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 229, 230 (2011).
2 Andrew R. Hickey, Cloud Computing Befuddles Consumers, Despite Use: Study,
CRN (Aug. 9, 2011, 1:45 PM), http://commcns.org/13JsYWF (citing results of a recent
study on "consumer familiarity" with cloud computing).
3 Maggie Holland, IBM Pulse 2012: Cloud Computing Use To Double By 2015, ITPRO
(Mar. 7, 2012, 9:26 PM), http://commcns.org/Xfo24V.
4 The term "the Cloud" stems from computer network diagrams that depict the Interet
as a vast cloud at the top of a network chain. Cloud Computing, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
http://commcns.org/SS137q (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). For present purposes, "the Cloud"
refers to remote servers owned and operated by providers and made accessible to users by
the Internet. Robert Gellman, Privacy in the Clouds: Risks to Privacy and Confidentiality
from Cloud Computing 4 (Feb. 23, 2009), available at http://commcns.org/WLrmoy.
5 Mladen A. Vouk, Cloud Computing-Issues, Research and Implementations, 16 J.
COMPUTING & INFO. TECH. 235, 235 (2008), available at http://commcns.org/XfofFi. The
global market for cloud computing is predicted to increase from approximately $41 billion
in 2011 to $241 billion in 2020. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, More Predictions on the Huge
Growth of 'Cloud Computing,' WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Apr. 21, 2011, 11:19 AM),
http://commcns.org/VNkxXN.
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Coinciding with this swell of cloud computing, consumers and their gov-
ernmental representatives have become increasingly sensitive to how their per-
sonal information is protected by cloud providers.6 In response, many countries
have taken steps to protect consumer data through legislative action.7 In Octo-
ber 1995, the European Union enacted Directive 95/46/EC in an effort to har-
monize data protection laws across the E.U. Member States Renowned as one
of the most comprehensive data protection laws enacted in any country, the
E.U. Directive has served as a model for legislation in many non-European
countries.9
The United States, however, has never passed a comprehensive regulation
on data privacy, instead relying on a sectorial approach to privacy regulation."
In part due to the lack of a comprehensive data privacy law, European cloud
customers have become reluctant to do business with cloud service providers
based in the United States. In fact, according to a recent survey, seventy per-
cent of Europeans are concerned with the security of their online data, due in
large part to a mistrust of U.S. privacy protections." European consumers cite
the USA PATRIOT Act ("Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act," or "PA-
TRIOT Act"), 2 which was enacted after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, to grant the federal government more authority to obtain information
about suspected terrorists, as emblematic of the United States' loose stance on
6 Alex Palmer, Report: 90% Of Consumers Worry About Online Privacy, DIRECT
MARKETING NEWS (Feb. 10, 2012), http://commcns.org/Uyu2ru (finding that "[n]inety per-
cent of U.S. adults worry about online privacy, while 41% do not trust most companies with
their personal data); Quentin Hardy & Nicole Perlroth, Companies Raise Concerns Over
Google Drive's Privacy Protections, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2012, 3:41 PM),
http://commcns.org/VawFDy.
7 See generally Oliver Brettle & Nicholas Greenacre, White & Case LLP, Countries At
A Glance-Data Privacy (2007), http://commcns.org/Xil28D (summarizing the relevant law
and practice of each country in the areas of collection, processing, and transfer of personal
data).
8 Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cy-
berspace, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1315, 1329 (2000). See generally Directive 95/46, of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data,
1995 O.J. (L 281) 3 1, available at http://commcns.org/Vt8zBt.
9 Reidenberg, supra note 8, at 1329 n.66 (listing Chile and Argentina as examples of
Latin American countries adopting European-style laws).
10 Jean Slemmons Stratford & Juri Stratford, Data Protection and Privacy in the United
States and Europe, 22 IASSIST Q. 17-18 (1998), available at http://commcns.org/W3rSIx.
I I Jennifer Baker, European Distrust of US Data Security Creates Market For Local
Cloud Service: Europeans Worried About the US Patriot Act Prefer to Keep Their Data in
the EU, COMPUTERWORLD.COM (Dec. 2, 2011, 7:55 AM), http://commcns.org/XHME9f.
12 See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered titles and sections of the U.S. Code).
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data privacy. 3 The potential for U.S. data surveillance has prompted some Eu-
ropean consumers to abandon contract negotiations with U.S.-based cloud pro-
viders. 4
The situation became increasingly tense after Microsoft declined to guaran-
tee that U.S. authorities would not access European customer data under the
PATRIOT Act.'5 Since then, some European-based cloud providers have seen
consumer concern over the PATRIOT Act as way to stir up sentiment for Eu-
ropean protectionism in cloud services. Recently, European-based cloud pro-
viders have marketed their services as a way to circumvent American jurisdic-
tion and protect consumer data from the reaches of the PATRIOT Act.' France
Telecom went as far as to proclaim that, "if all the data enterprises were going
to be under control of the U.S., it's not really good for the future of the Euro-
pean people."' 7
European government officials are echoing the private sector's distrust of
American privacy laws, and some have urged European companies to avoid
U.S.-based cloud providers. For example, Dutch Minister of Safety and Justice,
Ivo Opstelten, cited the PATRIOT Act as a reason to exclude U.S. cloud pro-
viders from bidding on Dutch government contracts.'8 Moreover, a member of
the Dutch parliament stated that, "data from Dutch citizens that is managed by
I3 See Amy Freeland, Data Privacy Protection Discrepancies Could Hamper U.S.
Cloud Provider Growth In Europe, NTTCoM.rv (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://commcns.org/Wkmo3r.
14 See Sean Gallagher, PATRIOT Act and Privacy Laws Take a Bite Out of US Cloud
Business, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 8, 2011, 8:49 AM), http://commcns.org/XHMIFU (reporting
that Patriot Act fears squashed BAE Systems' plans to adopt Microsoft Office 365, a cloud-
based version of the Microsoft Suite).
15 Ian Walden, Accessing Data in the Cloud: The Long Arm of the Law Enforcement
Agent I (Queen Mary Univ. of London, Working Paper No. 74, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/XHMJcX. When asked whether Microsoft could "guarantee that EU-
stored data, held in EU based datacenters, will not leave the European Economic Area under
any circumstances - even under a request by the Patriot Act," Gordon Frazer, the manag-
ing director of Microsoft UK, replied that "Microsoft cannot provide those guarantees. Nei-
ther can any other company." Zack Wittaker, Microsoft Admits Patriot Act Can Access EU-
Based Cloud Data, ZDNET (June 28, 2011, 8:10 AM), http://commcns.org/WbW4Zr.
16 See, e.g., Jennifer Baker, Europe Cloud Vendors Cleaning Up With Data Protection
Fears, TECHWORLD (Dec. 5, 2011, 10:14 AM), http://commcns.org/W3s2JH ("[T]wo Swed-
ish companies, Severalnines and City Network, have begun promoting their newly merged
service as 'a safe haven from the reaches of the US Patriot Act."'); Cornelius Rahn,
Deutsche Telekom Wants 'German Cloud' to Shield Data From US., BLOOMBERG.COM
(Sept. 13, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://commcns.org/W9KX2f (quoting German cloud operator,
T-Systems' CEO, Reinhard Clemens, in his attempt to lure customers by stating that "[a]
German cloud would be a safe cloud.").
17 Barb Darrow, Buckle Upfor A New Wave of Cloud Protectionism, GIGAOM (Jan. 17,
2012, 6:40 AM), http://commcns.org/XHMMp7.
18 Alan Charles Raul, RAUL: Preventing Digital Trade War in the Cloud, THE WASH-
INGTON TIMES (Oct. 28, 2011), http://commcns.org/UyuGVV.
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the government should exclusively be stored within Dutch borders using Dutch
companies."9 European lawmakers characterize the PATRIOT Act as a mech-
anism for U.S. authorities to gain access to E.U. consumer data, and have taken
a hard stance against it.
Despite support for European protectionism in the cloud, it is not clear that
choosing a European-based cloud service provider will protect a consumer's
information from the reaches of the PATRIOT Act. As this paper will show,
the reach of the PATRIOT Act is wide and potentially encompasses European
cloud providers that operate entirely within the European Union. Furthermore,
an analysis of the European Privacy Directive reveals that it provides little, if
any, greater protection for consumer information in the national security con-
text. In response to the numerous calls for European customers to abandon
U.S.-based could providers, this paper will critically analyze the legal grounds
for the claim that the PATRIOT Act is reason to promote European protection-
ism in cloud services. Part II of this paper provides a general overview of the
technical and commercial architecture of cloud computing. Part III discusses
the PATRIOT Act and its extraterritorial applications to European-based cloud
providers. Part IV examines the current framework and scope of the European
Privacy Directive. Part V concludes with a discussion on the merits of Euro-
pean protectionism in the cloud and recommends an approach to achieve a co-
ordinated system to protect the security interests of consumers.
II. WHAT IS CLOUD COMPUTING?
Understanding how the cloud operates is essential to appreciate the complex
jurisdictional issues that arise in cloud computing. Some consider the cloud to
have "supra-territoriality" because of the extent of its network capabilities, the
multiple layers of service models offered, and the ability for data to be trans-
ferred to remote locations-often without the consumer's knowledge." This
section will detail the architecture of the cloud, and examine the reasons why
special jurisdictional issues may arise for data stored in the cloud.
In essence, cloud computing is remote computing with software and data-
19 Id. cf. Viviane Reding, Vice-President, European Comm'n, Speech at the Second
Annual European Data Protection and Privacy Conference: The Future of Data Protection
and Transatlantic Cooperation (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/WkmRCw
("We need free flow of data between our continents. And it doesn't make much sense for us
to retreat from each other.").
20 Alan Charles Raul, Real Harmony in Cloud Computing Between U.S., EU Closer
Than You Think, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), July 26, 2011, available at
http://commcns.org/YcoIlF; see also Bharath Chandrasekhar, What is Cloudbursting?,
TREND CLOUD SECURITY BLOG (Mar. 15, 2011), http://commcns.org/l1 ICWOHX (noting that
new innovations allow data to "seamlessly" transfer to another location to meet heightened
demand).
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bases accessed through the Internet.2 The services are generally paid for by the
amount that they are used, but in some cases there may also be a modest sub-
scription fee, or it may be free for use and paid for through advertising.2 The
main concept of cloud computing is that IT services, which were traditionally
carried out on user-owned hardware and software, are outsourced to cloud pro-
vider machines and software that the consumer rents from the cloud provider. 3
Consumers usually choose to outsource IT services to the cloud because it re-
duces IT overhead, allows for greater flexibility, and reduces the total cost of a
user's computing practices. 4 A cloud has five essential characteristics, is cate-
gorized into three different service models, and is deployed in four different
models.25
A. Five Essential Characteristics of the Cloud
As defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST"),
a cloud includes: (1) on-demand self-service, (2) broad network access, (3)
resource pooling, (4) rapid elasticity, and (5) measured service.26 First, through
on-demand self-service, a consumer can "unilaterally provision computing
capabilities, such as server time and network storage, as needed automatically
without requiring human interaction with each service provider." 7 In other
words, a consumer is able to purchase resources on an as-needed basis. 28 In the
context of the cloud, a consumer may purchase more infrastructure capacity
within minutes, compared to the weeks or months it would take to increase
capacity through building a traditional in-house IT architecture.29
Second, cloud computing enables broad network access. That is, resources
stored on the cloud are available on any computing device, regardless of plat-
form (e.g., desktop, laptop, mobile phone, or tablet), from any Internet-
21 Harshbarger, supra note I, at 231.
22 Miranda Mowbray, The Fog Over the Grimpen Mire: Cloud Computing and the Law,
6 SCRIPTED 129, 133 (2009).
23 Id.
24 Mladen A. Vouk, Cloud Computing - Issues, Research and Implementations, 16 J.
Computing & Info. Tech. 235 (2008).
25 Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, in RECOM-
MENDATIONS OF THE NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., at 2 (Nat'l Inst. of Standards &
Tech., Special Publication Ser. No. 800-145, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/IOCUHcR.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Thomas W. Shinder, Private Cloud Security Challenges - On Demand Self Service,
MICROSOFT TECHNET WIKI, http://commcns.org/Vt9DFm (last updated Jan. 17, 2012, 11:55
AM).
29 Id.
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connected location." Thus, a consumer is able to transition from platform to
platform without having to transfer data from one device to another. The versa-
tility broad network access provides is attractive to many consumers, and is
often the most recognized feature of cloud computing."
Resource pooling, the cloud's third characteristic, refers to the fact that
computing resources available on the cloud (e.g., storage, software, and net-
work bandwidth) are shared by multiple consumers simultaneously. This type
of architecture is called a "multi-tenant model" because multiple consumers
(tenants) occupy the same set of resources.32 Resource pooling is beneficial to
the cloud provider because it allows data to reassign tenants to different loca-
tions in the cloud in order to optimize resource usage. However, this also
means that the consumer generally has no control over-or knowledge of-the
exact location of his or her data.33 This type of arrangement could lead to con-
sumer confusion and may subject consumer data to other jurisdictions without
the consumer's knowledge.
Closely related to resource-pooling is rapid elasticity of services. A cloud's
rapid elasticity allows a consumer to easily purchase more computing re-
sources in any quantity, at any time.3" If a consumer anticipates an increased
demand for cloud services, they can simply purchase more capacity from the
cloud provider. This also enables a consumer to scale back those services if
demand eventually decreases.33 For service providers, this means that capabili-
ties must expand or contract based on corresponding customer demand.36
Finally, "[c]loud systems automatically control and optimize resource use by
leveraging a metering capability," typically on a pay-per-use or charge-per-use
basis, in a way that is appropriate for the type of service.37 In this respect, the
cloud provider acts much like a utility service-it measures the amount of re-
sources that the consumer uses and charges the consumer accordingly.3"
30 Mell & Grance, supra note 25, at 2.
31 Id. (describing broad access networks as an "essential characteristic").
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Mell & Grance, supra note 25, at 2.
35 Clint Boulton, Forrester's Advice to CFOs: Embrace Cloud Computing to Cut Costs,
EWEEK.COM (Oct. 31, 2008), http://commcns.org/U4Udac (describing this scalability as a
"by-the-drink" payment plan). The value of the Cloud's ability to elastically provision re-
sources arises from the fact that businesses must worry about both excess and insufficient
resources; the former is costly and inefficient, while the latter poses serious risks, such as
lost business opportunities. Joe Weinman, Cloudonomics: A Rigorous Approach to Cloud
Benefit Quantification, 14 J. SOFTWARE TECH. 10, 10, 14-15 (2011), available at
http://commcns.org/XHN4we.
36 Mell & Grance, supra note 25, at 2.
37 Id. at 2 & n. 1. Some examples of services requiring different levels of metering capa-
bilities include "storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts." Id. at 2.
38 Weinman, supra note 35, at 10, 14.
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B. Cloud Architecture and Service Models
Cloud computing architecture consists of three layers: infrastructure (hard-
ware), platform (operating systems), and application (software run by the us-
er).39 These three layers can be conceptualized as stacked upon each other, with
the application layer working on top of the platform, which in turn works on
top of the infrastructure." Corresponding with each of these architecture layers
are three different service models: Infrastructure as a Service ("IaaS"), Plat-
form as a Service ("PaaS"), and Software as a Service ("SaaS").4' As explained
below, each service model gives the consumer a different level of functionality
and control.
With IaaS, the consumer purchases infrastructure services from the cloud
provider, but manages the layer on top of the infrastructure itself.42 Consumers
of IaaS generally include application owners and others who need access to
virtual servers and cloud storage. 3 The PaaS model offers the consumer a de-
velopment platform in addition to the services provided with IaaS, and gives
the consumer the capability of deploying his or her own applications "using
programming languages, libraries, services, and tools" that the PaaS provider
supports." Consumers of PaaS are generally application owners who outsource
the platform necessary to run these applications."' Finally, the SaaS model of-
fers the costumer the full application service for the cloud service provider.46
39 Grace Walker, Cloud Computing Fundamentals, A Different Way to Deliver Com-
puter Resources, IBM (Dec. 17, 2010), http://commcns.org/W9LcdL; see also Mell &
Grance, supra note 25, at 2 & n.2 (abstractly summarizing the Cloud's framework).
40 Kate Craig-Wood, IAAS vs. PAAS vs. SAAS Definition, KATE'S COMMENT (May 18,
2010, 4:39 PM), http://commcns.org/Vt9TEu (using graphic material to better explain the
relationships between IaaS, PaaS, and laaS).
41 Lee Badger et al., Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, in RECOMMEN-
DATIONS OF THE NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., at 2-1, 2-2 (Nat'l Inst. of Standards &
Tech., Special Publication Ser. No. 800-146, 2012); see also Bart Czernicki, IaaS, PaaS and
SaaS Terms Clearly Explained and Defined, SILVERLIGHT HACK (Feb. 27, 2011, 1:23 PM),
http://commcns.orgf/J4Ugmx (using two simple, but very helpful, diagrams to explain IaaS,
PaaS, and SaaS).
42 Badger, supra note 41, at 2-2; see also Czemicki, supra note 41 (noting that examples
of IaaS include Windows Azure, RackSpace, and SoftLayer); see generally Craig-Wood,
supra note 40.
43 Bill Loeffler et al., Reference Architecture for Private Cloud: What is Infrastructure
as a Service, MICROSOFT TECHNET WIKI, http://commcns.orgNt9XUz (last updated Mar.
22, 2012, 4:39 PM) (discussing, in the "Comparison of Cloud Service Models" diagram, the
consumer-base for SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS).
44 Mell & Grance, supra note 25, at 2-3.
45 Loeffler et al., supra note 43 (discussing, in the "Comparison of Cloud Service Mod-
els" diagram, the consumer-base for PaaS); see also Craig-Wood, supra note 40 (diagram-
ing the set-up of the service layers and listing, as examples, the following providers of infra-
structure software: Java, Windows, ORACLE and Google apps).
46 Mell & Grance, supra note 25, at 2; Czernicki, supra note 41 (describing SaaS as the
layer giving "business functionality"); see generally Loeffler et al., supra note 43 (providing
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This is the layer with which consumers are most familiar, as it runs on-demand
applications such as Gmail, Facebook, and Dropbox.47
The tiered structure of the cloud means that the services provided to the end
user usually involve layers of providers of which the consumer is unaware.4"
For instance, while consumers of the file-storage service DropBox see it as a
SaaS provider, DropBox, which relies on Amazon's infrastructure, considers
Amazon an IaaS provider.49 In this way, companies have the discretion to spe-
cialize in one level of cloud service, which ultimately provides better products
for the customer. However, this fragmented approach to cloud services results
in a lack of direct consumer-control over data. Thus, consumers may remain
uncertain of the jurisdiction that governs the protection of their data.
C. Deployment Models
The final way that cloud services are delineated is by deployment models:
private, public, community, or hybrid. In a private cloud, the infrastructure is
for the exclusive use of a single organization with multiple consumers or busi-
ness units." The infrastructure may be owned and operated by the organization
itself, a third party, or some combination of the two; the servers may be on-site
or outsourced to a hosting company.5
In a public cloud, the infrastructure is open for use by the general public or a
large industry group and is owned and operated off-site by a cloud service pro-
vider.52 Including systems such as the Google App Engine, Microsoft Windows
Azure, and Amazon EC2, this is the type of deployment with which consumers
are most familiar. 3
In a community cloud, the cloud infrastructure is shared by several organiza-
tions with a common interest or objective (e.g., mission, security requirements,
a useful table listing the typical SaaS provider's consumer-base, as well as the services it
provides).
47 Walker, supra note 39 (noting Gmail, Google Calendar, and Google Docs as exam-
ples of SaaS providers). W Kuan Hon & Christopher Millard, Data Export in Cloud Com-
puting - How Can Personal Data Be Transferred Outside the EEA? The Cloud of Unknow-
ing, Part 4, 9 SCRIPTED 25, 29 & n.14 (2012), available at http://commcns.org/Vaxf4d
(last visited Nov. 10, 2012) (identifying DropBox and Facebook as prominent examples of a
SaaS).
48 Hon & Millard, supra note 47, at 29.
49 Id.
50 Mell & Grance, supra note 25, at 3.
51 Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the Morning-Professional Eth-
ics at the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 111, 170 (2011-2012).
52 John Soma et al., Chasing the Clouds Without Getting Drenched: A Call for Fair
Practices in Cloud Computing Services, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 193, 198 (2011).
53 Cade Metz, Say Hello to Windows Azure, the World's Most Misunderstood Cloud,
WIRED ENTERPRISE (Apr. 27, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://commcns.orgfW3suaE.
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policy, or compliance considerations). 4 However, like a private cloud, it may
exist on or off-site, managed by the organizations themselves or outsourced to
a third party." The community cloud model is particularly useful for sharing
services with multiple departments or agencies of the same entity. For instance,
Microsoft is developing a community cloud for use by U.S. federal, state, and
local governments. 6
Finally, a hybrid cloud is composed of two or more cloud models-private,
community, or public-that remain separate and unique entities. Despite their
apparent separation, these entities are bound together by standardized or pro-
priety technology that enables data and applications to be transferred between
the two when necessary." This type of data portability is called "cloud burst-
ing," and allows a cloud system to utilize resources from a connected system
when demand requires.
The boundless nature of the cloud has the potential to subject consumer data
to multiple jurisdictions. The multi-tenant approach that allows for greater
economies of scale and lower prices, also leads to the potential for consumer
data to be stored and subject to jurisdictions that consumers are not even
aware. Furthermore, the choosing a public deployment model in which re-
sources are shared can limit the consumer's control over his or her data. The
next section will examine the provisions of the PATRIOT Act that related to
data security issues, then discuss the extent to which the PATRIOT Act can
apply extraterritorially given the global nature of the cloud.
III. THE PATRIOT ACT
In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, the United States Congress passed the PATRIOT
Act.58 The PATRIOT Act was reauthorized in 2006,"9 with the addition of some
privacy protections,' and again in 2010.6" The primary objective of the PA-
54 Mell & Grance, supra note 25, at 3.
55 Soma et al., supra note 52, at 198.
56 Rutrell Yasin, Microsoft Building a Government Community Cloud, GCN (Mar. 2,
2012), http://commcns.org/1OCV1Zk.
57 Mell & Grance, supra note 25, at 3.
58 See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
59 Extension of Sunset of Certain Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Lone
Wolf Provision of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 109-160, 119 Stat. 2957 (2005).
60 USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-178, 120 Stat. 278 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)-(g) (2006)) (clarifying that
individuals who receive FISA orders can challenge nondisclosure requirements, and that
individuals who receive NSLs are not required to disclose the name of their attorney).
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TRIOT Act was to provide federal officials with more discretion to intersect
domestic and foreign communications, "both for law enforcement and foreign
intelligence gathering purposes."62 Although the PATRIOT Act did not create
any new procedural mechanism for U.S. law enforcement officers to obtain
information, it expanded the scope of certain discovery mechanisms that were
already available.63 Today, two discovery mechanisms are relevant to obtaining
data on the cloud: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Orders ("FISA Or-
ders")' and National Security Letters ("NSLs").65
A. Expanded Authority to Issue Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Orders
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA") permitted the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to apply to a
special court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to obtain business
records for the primary purpose of gathering information on foreign powers or
an agent of a foreign power." FISA Orders were granted in ex parte proceed-
ings, with only the FBI presenting evidence to the court. 7 Records were origi-
nally limited to car rentals, hotels, storage lockers, and common-carrier re-
cords.6"
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act expanded the scope of FISA Orders in
three important respects. First, it expanded the type of documents that could be
obtained to include "any tangible thing[] (including books, records, papers,
documents and other items) for an investigation to protect against international
61 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 and Intelligence Re-
form and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 Extensions, Pub. L. No. 111-141, 124 Stat. 37
(2010) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1805, 1861, 1862 (2010)). This act extends the use of
roving wiretaps, searches for business records, and conducting surveillance of individuals
suspected of terrorist-related activities not linked to terrorist groups. Obama Signs Last-
Minute Patriot Act Extension, FOxNEWS.COM (May 27, 2011), http://commcns.org/SbI Koc.
62 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31377, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2002), available at http://commcns.org/Sbl QML.
63 See Alex C. Lakatos, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Privacy of Data Stored in the
Cloud, MAYER BROwN (Jan. 18, 2012), http://commcns.org/UTSUIF.
64 EDWARD C. Liu, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40138, AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) EXTENDED UNTIL JUNE 1, 2015, at 1, 4 (2011),
available at http://commcns.org/U4Us5k.
65 See Lakatos, supra note 63 (defining a "National Security Letter" as "a form of ad-
ministrative subpoena that the FBI and other US government agencies can use to obtain
certain records and data pertaining to various types of government investigations").
66 Peter P. Swire, The Future of Internet Surveillance Law: A Symposium to Discuss
Internet Surveillance, Privacy & the USA PATRIOT Act: Surveillance Law: Reshaping the
Framework: The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1306, 1329 (2004); see also Lakatos, supra note 63.
67 Lakatos, supra note 63.
68 Id.
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terrorism and clandestine intelligence activities."'69 This includes data stored in
the cloud." Second, Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act included a "gag" provi-
sion, which prevents a party receiving a FISA order from disclosing that fact."
Thus, in practical application, a cloud service provider would be prohibited
from informing its customers that it shared the customer's data with the FBI.72
Third, the legal standard to obtain the order was changed, eliminating the need
for any particularized showing." Rather, the FBI need only "specify that the
records concerned are sought for an authorized investigation... to protect
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."" In prac-
tical effect, this change means that FISA orders can apply to someone who is
neither the target of the investigation, nor an agent of a foreign power.75 In rela-
tion to the cloud, Section 215 would allow an entire database to be subject to a
FISA order as long as there is "an authorized investigation."76
Under the USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005, Congress addressed some of these concerns under Section 215 by adding
a provision that allows the recipient of a FISA order to oppose it before the
FISA court and to contest the gag order after one year. Despite these changes,
many providers and consumers alike remain troubled by this provision.77
B. Expanded Authority to Issue National Security Letters
NSLs are administrative subpoenas issued by a federal agency that require
the production of information held by third parties,78 such as financial institu-
tions, consumer reporting agencies, and wire or electronic service providers,
such as cloud providers. 9 NSLs are particularly worrisome because they do not
require judicial oversight." Additionally, they include a "gag" provision that
prohibits the third party from disclosing that it received an NSL.8' Prior to the
69 See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a) (2006).
70 Lakatos, supra note 63.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Swire, supra note 66, at 1331.
74 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2) (2006).
75 Swire, supra note 66, at 1329.
76 Id.
77 Lakatos, supra note 63.
78 The Permanent Provisions of the PATRIOT Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 13
(2011) (statement of Todd Hinnen, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen. for National Security) [here-
inafter 2011 PATRIOT Act Hearing].
79 Lakatos, supra note 63.
80 Swire, supra note 66, at 133 1.
81 2011 PATRIOTAct Hearing, 13 (statement of Todd Hinnen, Acting Assistant Att'y
Gen. for National Security).
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PATRIOT Act, NSLs granted the FBI authority to subscriber information from
telephone companies and Internet Service Providers and account information
from banks and credit reporting agencies.8 2 Section 505 of the PATRIOT Act,
Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism, dramatically expanded the
scope of NSLs.
Similar to the expansion of FISA orders under Section 215, Section 505
amended the standard of proof that is required to issue NSLs. Previously,
NSLs were not issued without specific and articulable facts demonstrating that
the information sought pertained to a foreign power or to an agent of a foreign
power.8 3 Under the PATRIOT Act, however, NSL issuance requires only that
the material be relevant to a national security investigation. Not surprisingly,
the use of NSLs began to dramatically increase after their scope was ex-
panded,84 from 8,500 NSLs in 2000 to between 39,000 and 49,000 per year
from 2003 to 2006." In 2010, the FBI made 24,287 NSL requests compared to
only 14,788 in 2009.6
Additionally, Section 205 expanded the number of officials that are author-
ized to issue NSLs. First, it granted all fifty-six FBI field offices with the au-
thority to make NSL requests. Second, it granted any government agency, not
just the FBI, with the authority to obtain information from a consumer-
reporting agency in connection with international terrorism or intelligence ac-
tivities.8 7 This expansion of officials authorized to issue NSLs has led to in-
creased concerns over the general lack of privacy safeguards under the PA-
TRIOT Act.
Concerns over the lack of privacy safeguards under the PATRIOT Act were
addressed in federal district court8 and ultimately led to amendments of the
Act in 2005,9 and again in 2006. o In Doe v. Ashcroft, the court addressed the
Act's failure to provide for any judicial review of the FBI's decisions to issues
82 Swire, supra note 66, at 1332.
83 2011 PATRIOT Act Hearing, 15 (statement of Todd Hinnen, Acting Assistant. Att'y
Gen. for National Security).
84 Lakatos, supra note 63.
85 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, RECLAIMING PATRIOTISM: A CALL TO RECONSIDER THE
PATRIOT ACT 12 (2009), available at http://commcns.org/Wko2ly.
86 Responses of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Questions for the Record Arising
from the June 8, 2011, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Regarding The Presi-
dent's Request to Extend the Service of Dir. Robert Mueller of the FBI Until 2013, at I
(Aug. 15, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/Vaxmgf.
87 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(a)-(b), 1681v (2006); Lakatos, supra note 63.
88 See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Doe v. Gonzales,
386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 78-82 (D. Conn. 2005).
89 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
§§ 115, 116, 120 Stat. 192, 211-17 (2006).
90 USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-178, 120 Stat. 278 (2006).
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NSLs.9  The Southern District of New York held that "the compulsory, secret,
and unreviewable production of information required by the FBI's application
of 18 U.S.C. § 2709 violate[d] the Fourth Amendment, and that the ["gag" or-
der] provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) violate[d] the First Amendment." '92 In
Doe v. Gonzales, the Southern District of New York addressed the Act's fail-
ure to provide for any procedure to challenge a "gag" order." The Court ruled
that the "gag" order provision was unconstitutional because it violated both the
First and Fourth Amendments.'
As amended, the PATRIOT Act includes a judicial enforcement mechanism
and a judicial review procedure for requests and nondisclosure requirements.95
The Act clearly states that the nondisclosure requirements do not preclude a
recipient from consulting an attorney,' provides a process to modify or set
aside the nondisclosure requirement,97 expands congressional oversight," and
provides for an Inspector General's audit of their use." The most notable of
these changes is the right to judicial review of NSLs, which gives recipients
the right to petition a federal court for an order modifying or setting aside the
NSL and federal judges the authority to alter compliance if it would be unrea-
sonable, oppressive, or otherwise unlawful.
C. Extraterritorial Application of the PATRIOT Act
In order to assess claims that refraining from using U.S.-based cloud service
providers will protect European consumers from the reach of the PATRIOT
Act, the territorially scope of the PATRIOT Act must be analyzed. Specifi-
cally, this involves examining the extent to which U.S. authorities can enforce
the PATRIOT Act extraterritorially in order to force companies operating
within the European Union to transfer data over to the U.S. government. There
are two mechanisms by which U.S. authorities can extend the reach of the PA-
TRIOT Act to European-based cloud providers. First, the United States can
subpoena business records from any company, including cloud providers, so
long as (1) they have personal jurisdiction over the entity, using the "minimum
91 See Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471; see also Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 78-82;
Lakatos, supra note 63.
92 Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 526-27.
93 Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 78-82.
94 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 §§ 115-116; USA
PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006.
95 18 U.S.C. § 3511 (2006).
96 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(3)(A) (2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681v(c)(1), 1681u(d)(1) (2006); 18
U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006); 50 U.S.C. § 436(b)(1) (2006).
97 18U.S.C. §3511(b).
98 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 115.
99 18U.S.C. § 2709.
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contacts" standard, and (2) the entity is in "possession, custody, or control" of
the data, regardless of the data's location.' Secondly, cloud providers operat-
ing in the European Union without any connection to the United States may
still be obligated to disclose their customers' data under Mutual Legal Assis-
tance Treaties ("MLATs") or on voluntary assistance by member E.U. states.
1. Enforcing the PATRIOT Act through Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction stemming from "minimum contacts" is based on the
Due Process Clause as expressed in the Supreme Court decision International
Shoe v. Washington."' Essentially, any company incorporated in the United
States or corporation that has its principle place of business in the United
States is subject to U.S. jurisdiction. In addition, any company that has "con-
tinuous and systematic" contacts with the United States may also be subject to
U.S. jurisdiction."2 It is important to note that the personal jurisdiction consid-
erations do not consider the "minimum contacts" of the consumer whose in-
formation is being sought by the government. Rather, it is the cloud provider's
jurisdictional contacts that are relevant in determining whether the information
may be seized under the PATRIOT Act.0 3 Because the cloud provider has
"control" of their consumer's data, it is capable of being seized through the
provider by the government.'"
Once a cloud provider is served with a subpoena, the provider must produce
all documents that are in its "possession, custody, or control."' 5 This includes
all data that may be in the "possession, custody, or control" of a branch or sub-
sidiary of a U.S.-based provider that is located anywhere in the world."° To
determine a party's level of control over the relevant documents, the court con-
siders the closeness of the relationship between the entities.' 7 In In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, ruled that it had the authority to compel production of docu-
100 Stuart D. Levi, Cloud Computing: Understanding Security and Jurisdictional Issues,
SKADDEN, AiPus, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, LLP (Apr. 3, 2012), available at
http://commcns.org/VtaHZX (follow the "Download PDF" hyperlink).
101 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
102 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)
(holding that a defendant must be "essentially at home" in order to exercise personal juris-
diction for "continuous and systematic" contacts).
103 Levi, supra note 100.
104 Id.
105 FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1); Lakatos, supra note 63.
106 Lakatos, supra note 63.
107 John Whelan & Sally-Anne Hinfey, No Cloud Over the PATRIOTAct, A & L GOOD-
BODY (A&L Goodbody, Dublin, Ir.), March 2012, 3.3, available at
http://commcns.org/WLsqIX.
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ments located abroad if the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants
and the defendants had control over the documents, despite conflicting foreign
law. 8 The court found that a U.S. court can order an American parent corpora-
tion to produce the documents of its foreign subsidiary when the "corporation
has power, either directly or indirectly, through another corporation or series of
corporations, to elect a majority of the directors of another corporation .... ""
However, the court noted that this power is discretionary and should be in-
formed by three factors: "1) the importance of the policies underlying the U.S.
statute which forms the basis for the plaintiftf's] claims; 2) the importance of
the requested documents in illuminating key elements of the claims; and 3) the
degree of flexibility in the foreign nation's application of its nondisclosure
laws.""' Additionally, U.S. courts can refuse to exercise its power in a way that
would violate foreign law, consistent with the principles of comity."' While the
court found some leeway for judicial discretion in compelling foreign entities
to provide data to U.S. authorities, the essence of the PATRIOT Act - combat-
ting terrorism - raises the expectation that most courts will consider the re-
quested information of such high importance that they will enforce the United
States' right to compel the production of documents." 2
For cloud service providers, this means that the U.S. government will be
able to serve FISA orders, NSLs, warrants or subpoenas compelling them to
provide their customers' data if the company is incorporated in the United
States, has an office or branch in the United States, or conducts "continuous or
systematic" business within the United States, regardless of the actual location
of the stored data."3 Due to the wide scope of jurisdictional reach, a con-
sumer's choice to purchase a European-based cloud provider is not enough to
ensure that data is beyond the reach of the PATRIOT Act.
2. Enforcing the PATRIOT Act through Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
While it might appear that European companies are able to secure their data
from the reach of U.S. jurisdiction by either declining to do business in Amer-
108 In re Uranium Antitrust Litig, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (involving an
antitrust action where the plaintiffs moved for production of documents but three foreign
statues, enacted for the express purpose of frustrating jurisdiction by U.S. courts, prohibited
disclosure of the documents).
109 Id. at 1144-5.
110 Id. at 1148 (summarizing Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958)).
"11 Cf. id.
112 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: SHIFTING FROM PROSECUTION TO PRE-
VENTION, REDESIGNING DOJ TO PREVENT FUTURE ACTS OF TERRORISM (2002),
http://commcns.org/WbXaoO ("[d]efending our nation and defending the citizens of Amer-
ica against terrorist attacks is our first and overriding priority").
113 Lakatos, supra note 63.
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ica or declining to do business with American customers, that is not likely the
case. The United States and most European governments have entered into
bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties ("MLATs") under which both gov-
ernments commit to work together in criminal investigations in order to access
information where they would otherwise not have jurisdiction."4 Most MLATs
declare that the countries will provide one another with "the widest measure of
mutual assistance in investigations or proceedings in respect of criminal of-
fenses."' 
5
In 2003, the United States and European Union updated their Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty to include a provision addressing data protection." 6 The
original MLATs did not speak directly to data privacy issues, but did allow for
denials for requests of information based on public policy grounds.' The U.S.-
U.K., U.S.-German, and U.S.-France MLATs, for instance, all contain the pro-
vision that requests could be denied if it would "impair [the requested coun-
try's] sovereignty, security, or other essential interests or would be contrary to
important public policy."" 8 The changes in the 2003 agreement were "meant to
ensure that refusal of assistance on data protection grounds may be invoked
only in exceptional cases."' The comments to this provision specifically pro-
hibit a country from refusing to comply with a request because the nations
have different systems for protecting data privacy or because the requesting
nation lacks a specified data protection authority.20 Therefore, U.S. requests
concerning terrorism investigations are rarely denied.''
European consumers are certainly justified in their concern about the pri-
vacy of their data as a result of the PATRIOT Act, but choosing an E.U.-based
cloud service provider will not ensure that their data is beyond its reach. Due to
the wide jurisdictional scope that American courts afford the PATRIOT Act, in
114 Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 579, 596 (2004); Lakatos, supra note 63.
115 See Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the United
States of America and France, U.S.-Fr., Dec. 10, 1998, Art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 13010, available
at http://commcns.org/WkokJf [hereinafter France MLAT]; see also Lakatos, supra note 64.
116 Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance Between the European Union and the United
States of America, U.S.-E.U., art. 9, June 29, 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 181/34) (EC), available at
http://commcns.org/lJyvQko [hereinafter E.U. MLAT].
"7 See, e.g., Lakatos, supra note 63.
118 Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom and Northern
Ireland on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters, U.S.-U.K., art. 3, Jan. 6, 1994,
T.I.A.S. No. 96-1202, available at http://commcns.org/13Jvyw0; France MLAT, supra note
116, art. 6; Supplementary Treaty to the Treaty of October 14, 2003 Between the United
States of America and Germany on Mutual Legal Assistance, U.S.-Ger., art. 6, Apr. 18,
2006, T.I.A.S. No. 09-1018.1, available at http://commcns.org/Vtbeex.
"9 E.U. MLAT, supra note 116, at n.9.
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., Lakatos, supra note 63.
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addition to the MLAT agreements between the United States and the members
of the European Union, it is unlikely that cloud providers will be able to evade
the scope of U.S. investigations." a Applying U.S. personal jurisdiction doc-
trine, U.S.-based companies and subsidiaries, as well as foreign companies that
do substantial business in the United States, satisfy the "minimum contacts"
test and thus may be ordered to produce any information in their "possession,
custody, or control."'23 Even if a company circumvents U.S. jurisdictional au-
thority, law enforcement will be able to obtain information through the Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaties with the E.U. member states.'24
IV. THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE
Another factor to consider when deciding whether it is worthwhile to boy-
cott American cloud service providers is the extent to which European laws
protect consumer data in similar circumstances. In 1995, the European Com-
mission issued "Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data". 25 The Directive was
established in order to provide a regulatory framework that guarantees the free
and secure movement of personal data across the national borders of E.U.
member countries, while setting a security standard for the storage, transmis-
sion, and processing of personal data. 26 As with all E.U. Directives that be-
come law, the Directive was implemented in each of the twenty-seven member
states' own national law, through legislation enacted locally.
27
122 Id.
123 Id.; see also Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (outlining the
"minimum contacts" requirement for exercising personal jurisdiction over an individual or
corporation); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1) (providing that an individual or corporation subject to
U.S. jurisdiction and served with a valid subpoena must produce any documents within its
"possession, custody, or control").
124 The EU-MLAT comments explain that this provision was "meant to ensure that re-
fusal of assistance on data protection grounds may be involved only in exceptional cases[,]"
and, as a result U.S. MLAT requests "are seldom denied for data protection reasons." Laka-
tos, supra note 63. See, e.g., James K. Knapp, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties as a Way
To Pierce Bank Secrecy 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 405 (1988); Julian M. Joshua, Peter D.
Camesasca & Youngjin Jung, Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties: Cartel
Enforcement's Global Reach, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 353 (2008-2009).
125 Council Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Octo-
ber 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281/31) (EU), available at
http://commcns.org/W3sPdv [hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
126 EU Data Protection Directive, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://commcns.org/VtbIXi (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
127 Application of EU Law, What are EU directives?, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://commcns.org/XHNHG2 (last updated June 25, 2012) (explaining that "EU directives
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A. General Provisions
The Directive defines personal data as "any information relating to an iden-
tified or identifiable natural person ('data subject')" that may be identifiable
"directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or
to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, eco-
nomic, cultural, or social identity."'28 It distinguishes between data controllers,
those who "determined the purposes and means of the processing of personal
data"'29 and data processors, who "process[] personal data on behalf of the con-
troller."'"3 "Processing" is all inclusive, and pertains to "any operation or set of
operations which is performed upon personal data....""
The Directive places obligations on data "controllers" who either operate
within the European Economic Area ("EEA"), who are "established" in the
EEA, or who "make[] use of' equipment located in the EEA.' The data con-
troller owes a duty to the data subject when the personal data is collected di-
rectly from the person.'33 Additionally, the controller must implement appro-
priate technical and organizational measures against unauthorized process-
ing.
34
Of particular importance to cloud providers, the Directive prohibits the
transfer of personal data outside of the EEA to a third country unless the third
country "ensures an adequate level of protection."'35 Because the cloud oper-
ates on a borderless network,'36 this places a substantial burden on the data con-
troller to ensure that consumer data is not transferred outside of the EEA or, if
data is transferred outside the EEA, that the third country has been deemed to
have an adequate level of protection.' Currently, only a few countries outside
lay down certain end results that must be achieved in every Member State ... but [national
authorities] are free to decide how to do so"). Because the Directive had to be implemented
on a local basis, there are some inconsistences in application of the Directive. Hon & Mil-
lard, supra note 48, at 28-29. This paper will focus on generally accepted applications of the
Directive.
128 Data Protection Directive, supra note 125, art. 2(a).
129 Id., art. 2(d).
130 Id., art. 2(e).
131 Id., art. 2(b) (listing such actions as "collection, recording, organization, storage,
electronic storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by trans-
mission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking,
erasure or destruction"); see also Cloud Computing and EU Data Protection Law, COM-
PUTERWORLDUK.cOM (Sept. 28, 2011, 4:00 PM), available at http://commcns.org/U4USZk.
132 Id., art. 4.
133 Id., art. 4.
134 Id.
135 Id., art. 25(1).
136 Mell & Grance, supra note 25, at 2.
137 Paul M. Schwartz, Data Protection Law and The European Union's Directive: Euro-
pean Data Protection Law and Restrictions on International Data Flows, 80 IowA L. REV.
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of the European Union have been declared by the European Commission to
have the requisite level of protections to satisfy the Directive. 3 The United
States is not one of these countries deemed to have an adequate level of protec-
tion.'39 This status has not been given to the United States because of the reach
of the PATRIOT Act and its lack of a comprehensive privacy regulation or
governmental agency devoted to privacy, and lack of governmental agency
devoted to privacy. 40
B. Safe Harbors
To help bridge the differences between the U.S. approach to privacy and that
of the E.U., the European Commission adopted Decision 520/2000/EC on July
26, 2000, which recognized certain safe harbors for transferring data into the
United States. 4 ' The U.S. Department of Commerce worked with the European
Commission to develop U.S.-specific safe harbors, whereby U.S. organizations
that promise to adhere to seven principles of privacy protection may transfer
data with European companies.' To qualify for the safe harbor, the U.S. or-
ganization must (1) adhere to seven Safe Harbor principles that ensure U.S.-
based companies provide adequate privacy protection;'43 and (2) publicly an-
nounce its compliance through certification letters filed annually with the De-
partment of Commerce or its designee.'"
C. Exemptions to Data Protection Directive
While a major goal of the Directive is to provide comprehensive protection
of personal data, drafters attempted to strike a "balance between the right to be
471, 483-84 (1995).
138 These countries include, Andorra, Argentina, Canada, Switzerland, Faeroe Islands,
Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, and Jersey. Hon & Millard, supra note 47, at 26, 31.
139 Charles Batchelor, Privacy: US and EU Clash on Confidentiality, FINANCIAL TIMES
(May 22, 2012, 4:56 PM), http://commcns.org/VaxCMo.
140 Id.
141 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided
by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by
the US Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, 10-12 (EC), available at
http://commcns.org/Xfrr3y.
142 See Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, EXPORT.GOV (July 21, 2000),
http://commcns.org/Ycplsa.
143 These seven principles include: (1) notice; (2) choice; (3) access; (4) onward transfer;
(5) security; (6) data integrity; and (7) enforcement. James M. Assey, Jr. & Demetrios A.
Eleftheriou, The EU-US. Privacy Safe Harbor: Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters?, 9
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 145, 151-52 (2001).
144 Id at 151.
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let alone and the legitimate interests of a society." '145 In this vein, the Direc-
tive's scope does not cover a number of uses of personal data, including: 1) all
activity falling not within the scope of "community law", such as national se-
curity, defense, public safety, economic or financial interests of the state, and
criminal proceedings;146 2) activities conducted solely for research; 47 3) activi-
ties "solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary ex-
pression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the
rules governing freedom of expression;"' 48 and 4) transfers of data to third
countries without adequate privacy laws if that transfer is done with the data
subject's consent, is pursuant to a contract, is required for a legitimate public
interest, or if the transferor adduces adequate safeguards by the transferee.1
49
Most European countries have utilized the Directive's exception for "com-
munity law" and have passed laws specifically restricting data protection for
national security reasons. For example, the Netherland's national data protec-
tion law states that, "this Act does not apply to the processing of personal data.
. . by or on behalf of the intelligence or security services referred to in the In-
telligence and Security Services Act [or]... for the purposes of implementing
police tasks."'50 The U.K. has similarly made personal data "exempt from any
of the provisions of. . . the data protection principles ... if the exemption from
that provision is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security."''
Spanish law provides that data protection "shall not apply to the collection of
data when informing the data subject would affect national defense, public
safety or the prosecution or criminal offences."'
52
The Directive affords E.U. consumers with substantial rights and protections
in their personal data, but the national security exemptions to the law allow
data to be unprotected in the same instances when the PATRIOT Act applies.
Critics who point to the PATRIOT Act as an example of the United States fal-
ling short of E.U. data privacy protections fail to recognize that the European
Privacy Directive does not apply when national security is at risk, or even in
145 Stephen A. Oxman, Exemptions to the European Union Personal Data Privacy Direc-
tive: Will They Swallow the Directive?, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 191, 192-93 (2000)
(quoting Ulrich U. Wuermeling, Harmonisation of European Union Privacy Law, 14 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411,414 (1996)).
146 Council Directive 95/46, art. 3(2), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39 (EC).
141 Id. at 42.
148 Id. at41.
149 See id. at 46.
150 Wet Bescherming Persoonsgegevens [Dutch Data Protection Act] art. 2(2)(b-c), Stb.
2000, p. 302 available at http://commcns.org/l ICWY78 (unofficial translation).
151 Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, art. 28(1) (U.K.), available at
http://commcns.org/XHNQte.
152 LEY ORGANICA 15/1999, de 13 de diciembre, de Protecci6n de Datos de Caricter
Personal art. 24, (B.O.E. 1999, 15), available at http://commcns.org/Sb2YQz (unofficial
translation).
[Vol. 21
European Protectionism in Cloud Computing
the prosecution of criminal offenses. In fact, when national security considera-
tions are invoked, a consumer's data, whether American or European, is not
protected from the reaches of government surveillance.
V. CONCLUSION
A critical examination of United States and European Union law indicates
that simply avoiding U.S.-based cloud service providers based on concerns
about the PATRIOT Act will not necessarily protect consumer data. Due to the
wide jurisdictional scope of the PATRIOT Act and MLATs with European
nations, merely selecting a European-based cloud provider does not guarantee
that consumer data will be beyond the reaches of the PATRIOT Act. If the
cloud provider is a subsidiary of a U.S.-based company, has a data center lo-
cated in the United States, or has "continuous and systematic" contacts with
the United States, it will be within the jurisdictional reach of the PATRIOT
Act. Even if a consumer chooses an E.U.-based provider that is outside the
scope of the PATRIOT Act, the United States will still potentially have access
to the data pursuant to MLAT treaties with its European allies.
The potential for intrusive governmental surveillance of personal data is not
exclusive to the United States. Both the United States and the European Union
allow the government substantial leeway in obtaining consumer information.
In particular, the PATRIOT Act authorizes access to data for national security
reasons, such as "international terrorism and clandestine intelligence activi-
ties."'53 Similarly, the E.U. Directive makes an exception for "community law,"
which includes national security, defense, public safety, economic or financial
interests of the state, and criminal proceedings,"' and authorizes "[m]ember
States [to] adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the obligation and
rights.., when such a restriction constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard
... national security."'55 Thus, an E.U. consumer's data is subject to govern-
ment confiscation for national security reasons regardless of the location of the
cloud service provider.
'53 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §505, 115 Stat. 365 (2001); see
also Lakatos, supra note 63.
154 See Oxman, supra note 149, at 191 (citing Ulrich U. Wuermeling, Harmonisation of
European Union Privacy Law, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 414 (1996));
see also Council Directive 95/46/EC, rec. 43, 1995 O.J. (L 281/31) (EU) (stating that "re-
strictions on the rights of access and information and on certain obligations of the controller
may similarly be imposed by Member States in so far as they are necessary to safeguard, for
example national security...").
155 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 13.
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